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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal we must decide two questions affecting 
New Jersey automobile insurance policies: first, whether 
under the state's "two-for-one" insurance policy non- 
renewal rule,1 an insurance carrier may apply its entire 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:29C-7.1(c) (West 1994) provides: "For every two 
newly insured automobiles which an insurer voluntarily writes in each 
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quota of "two-for-one" credits to decline to renew the 
personal automobile insurance policies sold by one of its 
former agents; second, whether the insurance carrier here 
has a perfected security interest in its former agent's post- 
bankruptcy policy renewal commissions. 
 
The district court held the insurance carrier could 
gradually terminate the agent's personal automobile 
policies under the "two-for-one rule" without violating New 
Jersey law. The district court also held the insurance 
carrier did not have a perfected security interest in its 
former agent's post-bankruptcy renewal commissions. In re 
Professional Ins. Management, No. 96-2499 (D.N.J. July 8, 
1996). We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 Professional Insurance Management ("PIM") is a New 
Jersey-licensed insurance broker and agent. In 1980, PIM 
became an agent for The Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance 
Companies ("Ohio Casualty"). Under the Ohio Casualty-PIM 
agency contract, PIM was authorized to market Ohio 
Casualty's personal and commercial insurance policies. PIM 
located customers, ascertained their insurance needs, and 
sold them appropriate Ohio Casualty policies. For personal 
automobile insurance policies, Ohio Casualty collected 
premiums directly from policyholders and sent PIM its sales 
commissions. For other types of insurance, PIM collected 
the premiums and forwarded them to Ohio Casualty, minus 
its earned sales commissions. Under the agency contract, 
Ohio Casualty could withhold PIM's commissions on 
personal automobile insurance policies to satisfy PIM's 
debt. Also, Ohio Casualty could terminate the contract on 
ninety days' notice. 
 
In the early 1990s, PIM experienced serious business 
difficulties and, as a result, owed Ohio Casualty $252,642 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
territory during each calendar year period, the insurer shall be permitted 
to refuse to renew one additional policy of automobile insurance in that 
territory in excess of the 2% limitation established in subsection b. of 
this section, subject to a fair and nondiscriminatory formula developed 
by rule or regulation of the commissioner . . . ." 
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in unpaid premiums. In March 1994, Ohio Casualty 
terminated its relationship with PIM. Later that year, PIM 
filed for bankruptcy. This appeal arises out of PIM's 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
The first issue on appeal is whether Ohio Casualty could 
decline to renew the policies of PIM's personal automobile 
insurance customers. After PIM declared bankruptcy, Ohio 
Casualty declined to renew 65 of the 69 automobile 
insurance policies sold by PIM and scheduled to expire 
between June 17 and June 30, 1996. PIM claimed that 
Ohio Casualty impermissibly targeted these policies for 
non-renewal following the termination of the agency 
agreement between Ohio Casualy and PIM.2  Ohio Casualty 
maintained that it was permitted to do so under N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 17:29C-7.1(c) (West 1994), New Jersey's"two-for-one 
rule," which allows an insurer to decline to renew one 
personal automobile insurance policy for every two new 
policies it writes. This action, if followed, would 
substantially reduce PIM's income by eliminating its 
renewal commissions.3 
 PIM sought an injunction from the bankruptcy court to 
require Ohio Casualty to rescind its non-renewal notices 
and to renew PIM policies that came due. PIM contended 
that Ohio Casualty's actions would "destroy" its personal 
automobile insurance business since all of its policyholders 
were up for renewal in the six months commencing October 
1, 1996. PIM argued that Ohio Casualty's conduct was 
unfair and discriminatory, and violated New Jersey 
insurance law. The bankruptcy court agreed and granted 
the injunction. In re Professional Ins. Management, No. 94- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. PIM attributes a number of different motives to Ohio Casualty. At 
various points in its brief, PIM asserts that Ohio Casualty targeted its 
policies because the agency agreement had been terminated, because 
Ohio Casualty believed PIM had a high loss ratio, because PIM declined 
to limit the number of Ohio Casualty policies it wrote, and because Ohio 
Casualty desired to withdraw from the business of writing personal 
automobile insurance policies in New Jersey. 
 
3. Neither PIM nor Ohio Casualty provided us with information regarding 
the percentage of business or the value of commissions PIM lost as a 
result of Ohio Casualty's practices. Therefore, we cannot ascertain the 
extent of economic damage PIM suffered because of Ohio's conduct. 
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13602 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 19, 1996). On appeal, the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey reversed, 
holding that Ohio Casualty's decision to target PIM policies 
for non-renewal did not violate New Jersey law. In re 
Professional Ins. Management, No. 96-2499 (D.N.J. July 8, 
1996). 
 
The second issue on appeal is whether Ohio Casualty has 
a perfected security interest in PIM's post-bankruptcy 
renewal commissions. Ohio Casualty claims it does. The 
bankruptcy court held that PIM, not Ohio Casualty, 
retained the right to receive PIM renewal commissions 
because Ohio Casualty did not perfect its security interest 
in PIM's book of business. The district court affirmed the 
bankruptcy court's order, adopting the bankruptcy court's 
reasoning. Id. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a)(3) (1988). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(d) (1988). In our review of bankruptcy court 
judgments, we, like the district court, apply the clearly 
erroneous standard to factual issues and exercise plenary 
review over legal issues. In re Fegeley, 118 F.3d 979, 982 
(3d Cir. 1997). Our review of the district court's 
interpretation and application of state law is plenary. 
Infocomp, Inc. v. Electra Products, Inc., 109 F.3d 902, 905 
(3d Cir. 1997); Salve Regina College v. Russell , 499 U.S. 
225, 231 (1991). In interpreting state law, we must predict 
how the highest court of that state would decide the 
relevant legal issues. Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
98 F.3d 1440, 1445 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
"For years, New Jersey's system of automobile insurance 
regulation, like those of many other states, has faced an 
intractable problem of providing coverage for high-risk 
drivers." State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. State , 590 A.2d 191, 
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195 (N.J. 1991). Because this appeal involves an 
interpretation of New Jersey's most recent legislative 
attempt to solve this problem, we will begin by briefly 
reviewing the recent history of New Jersey automobile 
insurance law. 
 
In 1983, New Jersey instituted a state-sponsored 
automobile insurance fund, the Joint Underwriting 
Association, to provide high risk drivers with "coverage at 
rates equivalent to those charged in the voluntary market." 
Id. at 195. The Joint Underwriting Association selected 
insurance carriers to collect premiums, arrange coverage, 
and administer JUA insurance policies. In addition to 
normal premium income, the JUA received funding from 
Department of Motor Vehicles surcharges for moving 
violations and drunken driving convictions, as well as flat 
charges and residual market-equalization charges imposed 
on voluntary-market insureds. Thus, under the JUA, the 
general population of motorists partially subsidized the 
insurance costs of high-risk drivers. Id. at 196. 
 
The Joint Underwriting Association was a failure. It lost 
money because collected premiums and additional funding 
were not sufficient to meet the amount of claims against 
JUA policies. In addition, the insurance industry began to 
refuse to insure anyone except the safest risks. Many safe 
drivers were forced to obtain JUA insurance. As a result, by 
1988, over 50% of New Jersey's drivers, including many 
who had never had an accident or serious traffic violation, 
had to be insured through the JUA. Id. 
 
In 1988, the legislature attempted to modify the JUA 
insurance system by "depopulating" the state pool to 
include only the highest risk drivers. Matter of Aetna Cas. 
and Sur. Co., 591 A.2d 631, 635 (N.J. Super. 1991), certif. 
denied, 599 A.2d 162 (N.J. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
1121 (1992). As a result, by 1992, the JUA covered only 
20% of New Jersey's automobile insureds. Despite this 
change, the JUA still operated at a deficit. See Governor's 
Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement, N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 17:28-1.4 (West 1994) ("The ever-increasing costs of 
our out-of-balance insurance system, coupled with the 
artificially low rates maintained for even the bad drivers in 
the JUA, has caused a deficit of approximately $2.5 billion 
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in the JUA and cash flow problems which have reached a 
critical point."). 
 
In 1992, the New Jersey legislature adopted the Fair 
Automobile Insurance Reform Act ("FAIRA"), which replaced 
the JUA with mandatory private-sector insurance. See Fair 
Automobile Insurance Reform Act of 1990, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 17:33B-1 et seq. (West 1994). Under FAIRA, insurance 
companies conducting business in New Jersey are required 
to insure New Jersey drivers who had previously been 
insured through the JUA. As FAIRA's "take all comers" rule 
stipulates: "No insurer shall refuse to insure, refuse to 
renew, or limit coverage available for automobile insurance 
to an eligible person who meets its underwriting rules as 
filed with and approved by the commissioner in accordance 
with the provisions of section 7 of P.L.1988, c. 156 
(C.17:29A-46)." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:33B-15 (West 1994). 
 
FAIRA also requires insurance companies to renew their 
automobile insurance policies. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 39:6A-3 
(West 1994) ("No licensed insurance carrier shall refuse to 
renew the required coverage stipulated by this act of an 
eligible person as defined in section 25 of P.L.1990, c.8 (C. 
17:33B-13) except in accordance with the provisions of . . . 
17:29C-7.1 or with the consent of the Commissioner of 
Insurance."). The New Jersey legislature provided several 
important exceptions to this mandatory renewal obligation. 
One exception, the "two-for-one rule," is the subject of this 
appeal. The "two-for-one rule" provides that an insurer may 
decline to renew one personal automobile policy for every 
two new policies it writes in a specific geographic area. N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 17:29C-7.1(c) (West 1994). The rule also 
stipulates that an insurer's non-renewal policy must 
comply with the "fair and nondiscriminatory formula" 
developed by the Commissioner of Insurance. Id. 
 
Ohio Casualty employed the "two-for-one" non-renewal 
exception to terminate 65 of the 69 personal automobile 
insurance policies sold by PIM and scheduled to expire 
between June 17 and June 30, 1996. PIM contends this 
treatment violates the requirement that the rule be 
employed in a "fair and nondiscriminatory" fashion. 
 
As the district court noted, the Commissioner of 
Insurance has promulgated a discrimination formula under 
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N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:29C-7.1(c). N.J. Admin. Code S 11:3- 
8.5(c) (1995) provides: "Nothing in [the "two-for-one rule"] 
shall be construed to authorize insurers to act in 
contravention of any applicable State or Federal law 
prohibiting discrimination on impermissible bases." PIM 
has not alleged that Ohio Casualty's conduct violates 
federal or state anti-discrimination laws. Nor are we aware 
of any facts suggesting that Ohio Casualty has done so. 
 
B. 
 
PIM contends that under N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:22-6.14a(l) 
(West 1994) the New Jersey legislature intended to provide 
terminated agents with protection from targeted non- 
renewal. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:22-6.14a(l) provides, in part: 
 
       [N]o insurance company which has terminated its 
       contractual relationship with an agent . . . shall, upon 
       the expiration of any automobile insurance policy . . . 
       which is required to be renewed pursuant to . . . 
       C.39:6A-3, refuse to renew . . . or refuse to service a 
       policyholder . . . upon the written request of the agent 
       . . . . The company shall pay a terminated agent who 
       continues to service policies pursuant to the provisions 
       of this subsection a commission in an amount not less 
       than that provided for under the agency contract in 
       effect at the time the notice of termination was issued. 
       . . . 
 
But the plain language of the entire statutory section 
undermines PIM's argument. The statute explicitly permits 
non-renewal under the "two-for-one rule." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 17:22-6.14a provides: 
 
       However, nothing in this section shall be deemed to 
       prevent nonrenewal of an automobile insurance policy 
       pursuant to the provisions of section 26 of P.L. 1988, 
       c.119 (C.17:29C7.1).").4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The New Jersey Appellate Court reached a similar conclusion when it 
considered the targeting of agents under N.J.S.A. 17:29C-7.1(b)--the 
"2%" rule--which is another exception to New Jersey's requirement of 
mandatory renewal. This section provides: 
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There is nothing in the language of this section that 
insulates former agents from the "two-for-one" rule. 
 
Nor does PIM cite anything in the legislative history to 
support its interpretation. PIM argues that the"legislative 
and judicial history of insurance law demonstrates a strong 
public interest in protecting" insurance agents. But PIM 
points to nothing specific in the legislative history to 
support its position and instead cites "obvious public 
policy," other statutory provisions that protect insurance 
agents, and pending legislation that would amend the"two- 
for-one" rule. But as Ohio Casualty points out, the New 
Jersey Legislature gave insurers the "two-for-one" credits 
"[i]n order to encourage depopulation of the JUA and 
expansion of the voluntary market." Senate Committee 
Statement to Senate, S. 202-2637 (N.J. 1988). See also 
Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement of Governor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       For each calendar year period, an insurer may issue notices of 
       intention not to renew an automobile insurance policy in the 
       voluntary market in an amount not to exceed 2% of the total 
       number of voluntary market automobile insurance policies of the 
       insurer...which are in force at the end of the previous calendar 
year 
       in each of the insurer's rating territories in use in this State. 
Id. 
 
In Mary R. Barry & Inland Agency, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Group, Inc., 
Appellate Division No. A-3544-94T2 (May 14, 1996), the insurance 
company had applied the "2%" rule to eliminate 209 out of 465 personal 
automobile policies written by a terminated agent. The terminated agent 
complained that an insurance company should not be able to target a 
terminated agent under the "2%" rule. Citing N.J.S.A. 17:22-6.14(a) 
("[N]othing in this section shall be deemed to prevent non-renewal of an 
automobile insurance policy pursuant to the provisions of section 26 of 
P.L. 1988, c.119 (C.17:29C7.1)"), the court found that the insurance 
company's decision to target the agent's policies for non-renewal did not 
violate New Jersey law. 
 
Barry may be distinguished, however, because unlike the 2-for-1 rule, 
the New Jersey legislature has not made the "2%" rule subject to the 
"fair and nondiscriminatory formula." Nonetheless, the court's opinion is 
instructive because in interpreting this exception to the requirement of 
mandatory renewal, the court gave effect to the plain meaning of the 
statute. 
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Kean, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:28-1.4 (stating that he agreed to 
"two-for-one" rule "[i]n the spirit of compromise"). 
 
Regardless of the purported intent of the legislature, and 
it appears to support Ohio Casualty's position, we are not 
free to ignore the plain and unambiguous language of the 
statute. Friedrich v. United States Computer Services, 974 
F.2d 409, 419 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Although a statute should be 
interpreted in a fashion that does not defeat the 
congressional purpose . . . a court may not rewrite an 
unambiguous law.") (citations omitted). Until such time as 
the New Jersey Legislature decides to alter implementation 
of the "two-for-one" rule, we must interpret the statuory 
scheme as written. See In re Barshak, 106 F.3d 501, 506 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
 
C.  
 
As in many states, New Jersey has established a complex 
regulatory scheme for the administration of personal 
automobile insurance. PIM contends the district court erred 
because "the formula contemplated by the Legislature is 
clearly something other than the nondiscrimination 
regulation as promulgated by the Commissioner." 
(Appellant Brief at 48). But PIM cites no authority for this 
claim. Instead, it relies upon the 1967 edition of the 
Random House Dictionary of the English Language, which, 
according to PIM, defines "formula" as "a set of words, as 
for stating something or declaring something definitely or 
authoritatively, for indicating procedure to be followed, or 
for prescribed use on some ceremonial occasion." (Appellant 
Brief at 49). PIM asserts that the Commissioner's anti- 
discrimination regulation, N.J. Admin. Code S 11:3-8.5(c), 
"does not fit this definition at all," because "[i]t does not set 
up any type of procedure for non-renewal and is therefore 
not a reasonable interpretation of the statutory requirement 
for a formula." Id. PIM suggests that because the 
Commissioner has not provided an adequate formula, the 
courts should do so. 
 
But the New Jersey legislature specifically directed the 
Commissioner of Insurance to promulgate a fairness 
formula. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 17:29C-7.1(c) ("[The `two-for-one' 
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rule is] subject to a fair and nondiscriminatory formula 
developed by rule or regulation of the commissioner."). The 
Commissioner promulgated N.J. Admin. Code S 11:3-8.5(c), 
which prohibits insurers from acting "in contravention of 
any applicable State or Federal law prohibiting 
discrimination." Apparently, the Commissioner has declined 
to forbid the use of the "two-for-one" rule against a 
terminated agent's book of business. As the district court 
stated, "[i]t is not for this court to decide that the 
Commissioner did not go far enough" when it declined to 
provide protections against discrimination in addition to 
those currently available under state and federal law. 
 
Those who are charged with the adoption and 
administration of New Jersey's automobile insurance laws 
are aware of the problems highlighted by this litigation, yet 
they have not decided to change the current scheme. Since 
passage of the "two-for-one" rule, the New Jersey legislature 
has considered and rejected proposed changes to New 
Jersey's insurance laws that would provide insurance 
agents with the protections PIM seeks here.5 That 
legislation has been introduced seeking to eliminate the 
precise conduct objected to by PIM is an indication that 
these "protections" are not currently available under New 
Jersey law. See Mary R. Barry & Inland Agency, Inc. v. 
Selective Ins. Group, Inc., Appellate Division No. A-3544- 
94T2, slip op. at 9 (May 14, 1996) ("Since the proposed bill 
was intended to curtail this practice, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the practice does not contravene the current 
statutory scheme."). Nor has New Jersey's Commissioner of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In 1993, the Legislature considered changes that would eliminate the 
"two-for-one" rule and the "2%" rule. S. Res. 2064, 207th Leg. (N.J. 
1993) (reintroduced as S. Res. 158 on January 8, 1994). That bill was 
never reported from the Senate Committee. A similar bill--S. Res. 557, 
210th Leg. (N.J. 1996)--was introduced on January 20, 1996. On June 
20, 1996, the Senate Committee substituted a version of the Bill that did 
not completely eliminate the "two-for-one" and "2%" rules but instead 
provided that an insurance company could not nonrenew more than 
10% of a particular agent's book of business in a given year. On 
November 25, 1996, however, the Senate substituted a different version 
of the bill. This version, which is currently pending before the Senate, 
would eliminate the "two-for-one" rule and the "2%" rule altogether. 
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Insurance promulgated a more stringent fairness formula. 
Revision or elimination of the "two-for-one" rule has been 
under consideration in the legislature and in the 
Department of Insurance. In the face of unambiguous 
statutory language, efforts to change the law should be 
directed there. 
 
For these reasons, we agree with the district court that 
Ohio Casualty's use of its non-renewal credits on policies 
sold by PIM did not violate New Jersey insurance law. 
 
IV. 
 
For personal automobile insurance policies, Ohio 
Casualty collected premiums from PIM's customers and 
then sent PIM its sales commissions. During the course of 
the 1990's, PIM fell into debt, owing Ohio Casualty 
$252,642.40. Under the agency agreement, Ohio Casualty 
was entitled to retain PIM's commissions to offset PIM's 
debts. After PIM filed for bankruptcy, Ohio Casualty 
retained and used PIM's post-bankruptcy policy renewal 
commissions to offset PIM's debts. Ohio Casualty claims it 
has a right to retain these commissions because it has a 
perfected security interest in them. PIM maintains that 
Ohio Casualty has not perfected its interest because the 
post-bankruptcy renewal commissions are contract rights 
and therefore must be perfected by filing.6 
 
The bankruptcy court held that Ohio Casualty did not 
have a perfected interest in the commissions because it did 
not have a perfected interest in PIM's book of business.7 
The bankruptcy court held: 
 
       As a general matter, Ohio's collateral, in the agency 
       agreement between the two parties, is the expirations, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. At oral argument, the parties agreed that for purposes of this cross- 
appeal we should assume that the 1980 agency agreement constitutes a 
security agreement. Furthermore, we only address the retention of 
commissions collected after PIM filed for bankruptcy. 
 
7. An agent's book of business refers to the body of information 
developed and collected by the agent including a policyholder's name, 
address, policy type, date of expiration, policy number and other 
information pertinent to a customer's insurance needs. 
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       also known as the debtor's book of business. 
       Expirations have been determined to be best 
       categorized for UCC purposes as "general intangibles," 
       which may be perfected only by filing, not by 
       possession. In re Roy A. Dart Ins. Agency, Inc., 5 B.R. 
       207, 14-16 (Bank D. Mass. 1980). Possession of the 
       commissions due to the agent does not act to perfect 
       Ohio's security interest in debtor's expirations. Debtor's 
       opportunity to collect commissions following the 
       turnover of its Ohio book of business is not disturbed 
       on this basis. 
 
In re Professional Ins. Management, No. 94-13602, slip op. 
at 31 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 19, 1996). The district court 
affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling on this issue, 
adopting the bankruptcy court's reasoning without 
additional analysis. In re Professional Ins. Management, No. 
96-2499, slip op. at 30 (D.N.J. July 8, 1996).8 
 
Although we agree with the bankruptcy court's 
conclusion, our reasons to affirm the judgment are 
different. Under paragraph three of the agency agreement, 
Ohio Casualty's collateral interests in PIM's book of 
business and in PIM's commissions are separate and  
independent.9 The right to withhold commissions functions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In analyzing whether PIM's interest is perfected, we look to New Jersey 
law. Although a federal statute, 11 U.S.C. S 552(b)(1) (1988), protects a 
creditor's pre-petition perfected security interest, the determination of 
whether PIM's security interest is perfected is a matter of state law. 
Pearson v. Salina Coffee House, Inc., 831 F.2d 1531, 1533 (10th Cir. 
1987), (citing In re Chaseley's Foods, Inc., 726 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 
1983); Havee v. Belk, 775 F.2d 1209, 1218-19 (4th Cir. 1985); In re 
Diamond 196 B.R. 635 (S.D. Fla. 1996)); see also Butner v. United States, 
440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (noting that state law governing perfection of 
security interests applies "unless some federal interest requires a 
different result"). 
 
9. The agency agreement provides, in part: "3. The Agent's records and 
use and control of expirations shall remain the Agent's absolute property 
and be left in his undisputed possession; provided, however, in the event 
of termination of this agreement, if the Agent has not properly accounted 
for and paid all premiums for which he is liable, the Agent's records as 
respects business placed with the Company shall become the property of 
the Company and the Company shall have sole right to use and control 
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as additional security over and above the right to assign, 
sell, or transfer PIM's book of business. For that reason, the 
perfection status of Ohio Casualty's interest in PIM's book 
of business does not determine its rights to PIM's post- 
bankruptcy commissions. Instead, each source of collateral 
must be analyzed separately. Although the district court 
and bankruptcy court failed to conduct this analysis, we 
will affirm, because Ohio Casualty does not have a 
perfected security interest in the retained commissions. 
 
When a debtor enters bankruptcy, an unperfected 
creditor's interest in collateral is subordinated to the rights 
of the bankruptcy trustee. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 12A:9-301 
(West 1994); 11 U.S.C. S 544(b) (1988). For that reason, in 
order to hold a secured position vis-a-vis the bankruptcy 
trustee, Ohio Casualty had to perfect its security interest in 
PIM's commissions before PIM filed for bankruptcy. We do 
not believe it did so. 
 
As we have noted, Ohio Casualty maintained a security 
interest in PIM's cash commissions independent from any 
interests it possessed in PIM's book of business. Ohio 
Casualty contends that it has a perfected interest in the 
post-bankruptcy commissions under 11 U.S.C. S 552(b)(1), 
which provides: 
 
       if the debtor and an entity entered into a security 
       agreement before the commencement of the case and if 
       the security interest created by such security 
       agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired 
       before the commencement of the case and to proceeds, 
       product, offspring, or profits of such property, then 
       such security interest extends to such proceeds, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
such expirations to the extent of the Agent's total indebtedness to the 
Company, unless the Agent provides other security acceptable to the 
Company . . . The Company, in the exercise of the right reserved to it 
above, may, at its option, retain all commissions which are payable or 
which may become payable under contracts of insurance represented by 
such expirations, or renewals, thereof, and apply same against the 
amount of the Agent's indebtedness to the Company, or may sell, assign, 
transfer or otherwise dispose of such expirations to any other agent or 
broker . . . ." 
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       product, offspring, or profits acquired by the estate 
       after the commencement of the case to the extent 
       provided by such security agreement and by applicable 
       nonbankruptcy law, except to any extent that the 
       court, after notice and a hearing and based on the 
       equities of the case, orders otherwise. 
 
As the Supreme Court has noted: "Section 552(b) sets forth 
an exception, allowing postpetition `proceeds, product, 
offspring, rents, or profits' of the collateral to be covered 
only if the security agreement expressly provides for an 
interest in such property, and the interest has been 
perfected under `applicable nonbankruptcy law.' " United 
Sav. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 374 (1987) (citations omitted); see also 
2 Thomas M. Quinn, Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code 
Commentary and Law Digest P 9-306 (2d ed. 1991) ("The 
security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected 
security interest if the interest in the original collateral was 
perfected . . . .") (quoting U.C.C. S 9-306). To prevail under 
S 552(b)(1), Ohio Casualty must establish that (a) the 
commissions in question are the proceeds of a PIM pre- 
bankruptcy asset and that (b) it had a perfected security 
interest in that collateral prior to bankruptcy. 
 
Ohio Casualty contends that PIM's right to commissions 
for post-petition renewal of policies PIM sold prior to 
bankruptcy was a pre-petition asset, that Paragraph 3 of 
the Ohio Casualty-PIM agency agreement gave it a security 
interest in that asset, and that the commissions eventually 
generated after bankruptcy as policies were renewed were 
the proceeds of that asset. Even if this reasoning is correct 
-- a question on which we take no position -- Ohio 
Casualty's claim cannot prevail because it failed to perfect 
its interest in the claimed asset before PIM filed for 
bankruptcy. 
 
We believe there are two ways to characterize Ohio 
Casualty's collateral. Ohio Casualty's security interest is 
either in the commissions themselves or in the right to 
acquire future commissions. Under either analysis, we find 
that Ohio Casualty did not have a perfected security 
interest prior to the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding. 
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If Ohio Casualty's interest is in the cash commissions 
themselves, its security interest is perfected by possession, 
rather than by filing a financing statement with the 
Secretary of State. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 12A:9-304 (West 1994). 
But perfection of cash collateral dates from the moment the 
secured creditor takes possession of the funds. N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 12A:9-305 (West 1994). Here, Ohio Casualty 
admittedly took possession of the post-petition 
commissions after PIM filed for bankruptcy. Therefore, its 
security interest was not perfected prior to the bankruptcy 
filing date and its interest is subordinate to that of the 
bankruptcy trustee. 2 Thomas M. Quinn, Quinn's Uniform 
Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest P 9-306[A][5] 
(2d ed. 1991) ("The secured creditor's claim to the proceeds, 
if `unperfected,' is vulnerable in bankruptcy."). 
 
Alternatively, if Ohio Casualty's security interest is in the 
right to future renewal commissions, its right to PIM's 
renewal commissions is contractual, flowing from the 
agency agreement. Under New Jersey law, contract rights 
are typically considered "general intangibles." See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 12A:9-106, comm. (West 1994) ("The term `general 
intangible' brings under this Article miscellaneous types of 
contractual rights and other personal property which are 
used or may become customarily used as commercial 
security."). General intangibles, unlike cash, are perfected 
by filing a financing statement with New Jersey's Office of 
the Secretary of State. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 12A:9-302 (West 
1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. S 12A:9-401 (West 1994). But Ohio 
Casualty failed to file a security interest. Because its 
contractual interest in PIM's future commissions was not 
perfected before bankruptcy, Ohio Casualty can not claim 
protection under 11 U.S.C. S 552(b)(1) with respect to any 
proceeds of that asset. See United Sav. Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 
374.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. At oral argument, Ohio Casualty contended that its interest was 
perfected because renewal is mandatory. This contention is meritless. As 
noted, renewal is not mandatory in New Jersey; insurance companies 
can decline to renew policies under the "two-for-one" and "2%" rules. 
Ohio Casualty's argument that its interest in the future commissions 
should be treated as a present possessory interest in money to be paid 
at a future date, and not a contractual right, is unconvincing. 
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The perfection rules were adopted by the drafters of 
Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code to provide 
potential creditors with adequate notice that certain assets 
of the debtor had already been pledged as collateral for 
previously acquired debt. They give creditors the means to 
identify the security status of the debtor's collateral prior to 
the provision of capital. 2 Thomas M. Quinn, Quinn's 
Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest, 
119-101[A][4][E] (2d ed. 1991) ("The parties to whom 
`perfection' does speak are the trustee in bankruptcy, 
creditors of the debtor who attach the collateral, later 
lenders who advance money against the same collateral, 
possible buyers of the collateral, and anyone else for that 
matter who deals with the collateral in some way . .. . It 
does so by requiring the creditor to publish his interest in 
the collateral in such way as to alert these concerned 
outsiders of that interest."). 
 
Here, Ohio Casualty took no steps, like filing afinancing 
statement, to put potential PIM creditors on notice of its 
interests in PIM's future commissions. Were we to adopt 
Ohio Casualty's position, it would undercut the purpose of 
the perfection rules. That Ohio Casualty had a right to 
offset PIM's commissions against PIM's debts under its 
agency agreement is insufficient, by itself, to create a 
perfected security interest. Future creditors could not rely 
on that agreement to provide notice of Ohio Casualty's 
claims since the future creditors were not privy to, nor had 
notice of, the contract. 
 
Ohio Casualty was required to file a financing statement 
to perfect any security interest it possessed in pre-petition 
contractual rights to post-petition PIM commissions. It 
failed to do so. Therefore, we will affirm the district court's 
judgment that Ohio Casualty maintains an unperfected 
security interest in the commissions. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of 
the district court. 
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